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I. INTRODUCTION
When the transistor was first invented in 1948 few firms were willing to invest in the new technology.
Apparently, only a massive government intervention stirred firms to the point where they pursued the technology on their own (Schnee, 1978) .1 This claim is supported by the observation that European firms, the equal of American firms in electronics components before the transistor, never recovered from the fact that they were not equally prodded by government support.
since then many firms have earned fortunes in exploiting this technology.
The industry in this example may have been one that imperfect competition disposed of this view. It was argued that a monopolist would always usurp such an industry to internalize the externa 1 economies. Rore recently several papers have followed Kenneth Arrow's (1962) lead in showing that a decentralized competitive equilibrium can exist with increasing returns to scale and externalities. For example Romer (1986) constructs a model in which there are increasing returns to knowledge, but the growth of knowledge is limited by decreasing returns to the production of new knowledge. These models are designed to yield a single competitive equilibrium.
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In this paper we consider the case where there can be areas of increasing returns to scale in the production of knowledge.
It is the n possible that there are several competitive equilibria involving different levels of research.
This opens the possibility that a profitable technology may be neglected merely due to a coordination problem: If all firms invested simultaneously they might all find it
profitable. Yet none is willing to risk investing too early and losing out at the expense of other firms that can enter later and draw on a pool of skilled technicians and an established knowledge base.
One might think that communication between firms easily resolves the problem.
games with costless Indeed, following the seminal work on communication by Crawford and Sobel (1982) , and applications by Farrell (1987) information however the switch to the pareto-preferred equilibrium may not always occur. Farrell and Saloner (1985) examine the question of when firms will switch to a new common standard, making their products compatible. This invol ves a similar coordination problem to the one analysed here, but there are a few differences. In the standard-switching problem firms have different preferences. Those opposed to the switch will communicate their opposition, but they cannot convincingly communicate to what extent they are opposed.
In the model considered here preferences play no role. Rather it is firms' estimate of the quaIity of other firms' research capability that determines whether they judge communication to be credible or not, in effect whether a firm that claims that i t will start researching will actually do so.
The result that communication promotes coordination requires common knowledge about parameters that deteraine the pay-off of other players -as well as about the rationality of other players. In the absence of such common knowledge any decision is "rationalizable" in the sense of Bernhea (1984) .
In One can also describe the inspiration effect as consisting of returns to researcher specialization. For example, the more researchers are acti ve in a field, the more profitable it becomes for one researcher to specialize on devices that raise the productivity of other researchers.
Industrial R & O decision makers of ten speak of the "acceptance effect", meaning that one firm is more likely to investigate a technology if a rival seems to become interested.
This effect may build on quite different mechanisms than the ones used here to justify the inspiration effect.
Yet its effect will be similar: Firms may avoid a new technology, each wai ting for the other to pick it up first. Here p is the price of goods which is the same for all goods due to symmetric demand and production.
The first order conditions, which are also assumed sufficient, are for households and firms respectively
From this one can determine equilibrium X and p and the firm's profit function as
It is apparent in (4) that firm profits may rise or fall in t depending on the slope of G{t) so there can easily be several points where R = o.
How plausible is a cost curve such as (2)? Some evidence from a recent survey of research managers in large and mediumsized industrial firms sheds some light on this issue. 3 The research managers were asked to choose a few of their own research projects and then to state whether the entry of rivals into the research area adressed by the various pro j ects was expected to raise or reduce the expected value of the projects.
The hypothetical rival was described either as a domestic firm (which implies in the case of Sweden firms in the vicinity of the researching firm) or a foreign firm.
Since all of the queried firms were multinationals with the bulk of sales on the world market the assumption is that the entry of a rival implies a similar degree of competition regardless of whether the rival is domestic or foreign. In contrast the externa l effects of research are presumably much greater for domestic firms. ideas will eventually exceed the m/i), given that the coordinator has A seller of an ide a then sets a sales price equal to his alternative return if he held on to the idea. This is his return discounted by the probability that enough other firms invest to make it worthwhile to commence research: Probably it is also very difficult to police members to check whether they really are investing at the rate they promised. The next section analyzes the role that mere communication can play in coordination.
IV. SYMMETRIC EQUILIBRIA WITH COSTLESS COMMUNICATION
This section examines the likely equilibrium in the case where no coordinator can profitably purchase ideas, but firms can engage in costless communication.
The seminal work in analysing the role of costless communication is due to Crawford and Sobel (1982) who show how the effectiveness of such communication depends on the degree to which players' preferences coincide. Applications of this idea include Farrell and Saloner (1985) and Farrell (1987) . However these applications differ from the current analysis in the payoff structure of the game and the type of private information which leads to different results. This can be summarized in a pay-off matrix.
This game has three Nash equilibria. All of them are symmetric.
In one both firms play "in." In the second both firms play "out."
The third is a mixed strategy equilibrium where the probability of entry p makes the other player indifferent between "in" and "out."
In some games the mixed-strategy equilibrium is the only symmetric one which leads to the conclusion that it is the only reasonable equilibrium for identical firms. In the present case however i t is less interesting • Note also that i t behaves perversely in that agreater benefit of entering R reduces the equilibrium probability of entering. It is clear the n that the optimal r is always unity regardless of the s that player 2 plays. Thus there is only a single Nash equilibrium.
Sobel (1982) This is consistent with the findings in Crawford , and Farrell and Saloner (1985) Define "in" such that the firm enters if it has a useful idea. Then one can write the pay-off matrix in terms of expected values as follows.
Now if (q R + (l -q) (-L» > M then the game has the same payoff structure as the original game. with costless communication then firms will always choose the in/in equilibrium.
If, however, (q R + (l -q) (-L» < M then there is only one Nash equilibrium, name ly out/out. We have thus derived a definite criterion for the choice of an equilibrium. The inefficiency arises because in some cases firms will not research even though the other firm actually had a useful idea, and in other cases firms will research even though the other firm did not have a useful idea. We can now redefine R = R(t) as the profit function, H = H(t) as the return to a non-researching firm and F(t,g) as the probability that t firms research a useful idea given that eacb of T firms has a chance g of having a good idea. Then costless communication leads to the in/in equilibrium if
f is~binomial distribution with E(t) = g T and vet) = T g (lg). However by the central limit theorem it can be approximated by a normal density function provided that T is large. f can then be estimated to have mean g T and variance T g (l -g).
From this one can derive comparative static results. These results depend on the fact that P changes with the variance of f( ).
A rise in the variance Vt can increase or decrease F depending on the shape of R(t). F igure 2 shows twc possibilities. with R 2 a decrease in the variance decreases P.
with R l one achieves the opposite effect. One comparati ve static resul t is that the total number of ideas relative to the threshold number is important. For example if 500 out of a thousand ideas must be researched to make research profitable for each firm firms may be more willing te research than if 5 out of 10 ideas must be researched.
Suppose that each unit t now refers to a ideas, each owned by one firm. Then each unit of t can be seen as sample of a with mean q and variance l/a q(l -q) (by the central limit theorem).
Then the total variance v t is l/a Tq(l -q}. Then it is clear that a rise in "a" raises the variance but leaves the mean unchanged.
Next, return to the possibility of a coordinator. The question is whether a coordinator may purchase ideas in a case where firms do not research.
Suppose the coordinator can purchase all ideas simultaneously. Since firms do not research on their own P must be below zero. The coordinator must then offer a price ab ove zero, and his expected return is
The immediate conclusion is that the larger M is the more likely it is that P < O and that a coordinator will take over. If there is more than one coordinator then competition between coordinators will drive their return toward zero. 4
A feature of this model, and most other models incorporating incomplete or asymmetric information, is that there is some common knowledge. For example, firm l estimates a chance q that firm 2's idea is feasible. Firm 2 knows that q and it knows that firm l knows that firm 2 knows. In many models same probablity distribution is assumed to be common knowledge. This common knowledge makes it possible for one player to calculate others' expected pay-offs for different strategies and thus determine his own optimal action.
Of ten i t is probably more real istic to assume that such common knowledge does not exist.
In that case communication may lose its ability to hel p attain a pareto-preferred Nash equilibrium.
In fact this is one of the hypotheses tested experimentally.
In the absence of common knowledge it remains unclear how the decision to enter or not is determined. Communication may now work less weIl. Each player must now entertain the possibility that other players do not enter because they suspect his estimate of their expected profitability to be low. since it is now impossible to calculate the opponents expected profits, the 4 An interesting implication of this mode l for industrial policy is that social value may be raised in some cases if the government subsidizes research in firms in away that allows it to check the quaiity of a firm's research opportunities. If the government proceeds to subsidize these projects it thereby sends a signal about the firm's research opportunites to other firms. This may suffice to motivate other firms to begin researching. 
Similarly it can be shown that the variance of t rises with ar:
increasing number of assets per firma the experiment below.
This idea is pursued l.r:
V. THE EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
The experimental hypotheses are the following:
l.
In the absence of common knowledge communication does not raise the probability of entry.
2.
In the absence of common knowledge agreater concentration of assets reduces the probability of entry if agreater variance of t reduces E(R).
To test these hypotheses subjects following game. Either subjects could were presented choose to enter the.
and receive a reward R(t) depending on the number of others that enter; or they could choose not to enter. In that case they received a different reward M(t). The pay-off structure is shown in figure 3.
In the common knowledge treatment subjects were informed that each of a total of 9 proj ects had 50% percent chance of being workable. The expected va lues of the pay-offs, assuming that all decide to enter, are in that case E(R) = 6.475 and E(M) = 4.518. Thus it is in the collective interest for all to enter.
The pay-offs consisted of draws in a subsequent lottery with each unit corresponding to one lot out of 100. The lottery prize was SER 20. Table 2 shows the 8 different treatments that were applied to 4 games each.
In the no-common-knowledge treatment subjects were told that other projects had a chance between O and 1 of being workable and that other subj ects may have more detailed knowledge ab out this probability. In fact though, and unknown to subjects, the chance was always 0.5 for all projects. When communication was permitted subjects were allowed to talk for five minutes. The concentration levels were either one project per person implying a total of nine subjects per game, or three projects per person implying three subjects per game. The subjects were students at the University of Stockholm from a variety of levels and courses • 9 students at a time 22 played through all 8 treatments. However they were informed of others' responses only af ter all 8 games were completed.
Se there were presumably no "repeated game" effects.
However there may have been an experience effect.
To mitigate this the ordet in which the 8 games were played was different for each of the 4 selections of 9 students.
RESULTS
The resul ts are shown in Tables 3 and 4 . 
